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Comment
Determining Reasonable Accommodations under the
ADA: Why Courts Should Require Employers to
Participate in an "Interactive Process"
I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA")in 1990, approximately 43,000,000 Americans had one or
more physical or mental disabilities.' As the population grows older,

the number of disabled Americans is increasing.2 These disabled
Americans often face discrimination in several areas, including the
workplace. 3
1. See William J.McDevitt, Seniority Systems and the Americans with Disabilities
Act: The Fate of "ReasonableAccommodation" After Eckles, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359,
360 (1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)(1994)). In determining the number of
disabled Americans,
[t]he [United States] Census Bureau defines a disability as difficulty in
performing functional activities (seeing, hearing, talking, walking, climbing
stairs and lifting and carrying a bag of groceries) or activities of daily living
(getting in or out of bed or a chair, bathing, getting around inside the home,
dressing, using the toilet and eating) or other activities relating to everyday
tasks or socially defined roles.
Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce Press Release CB97-148, One in 10 Americans
Reported

a

Severe

Disability in

1994-95,

CENSUS

BUREAU

REP.

1

(1997)

<http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/cb97- 148.html> [hereinafter Census Bureau].
2. See McDevitt, supra note 1, at 360 n.6. According to 1991-92 Census Bureau data,
the number of disabled Americans was nearly 49 million. See CENSUS BUREAU, supra
note 1, at 1. Data collected between October 1994 and January 1995 revealed an increase
in disabled Americans to approximately 54 million (about one in five Americans). See
id.
3. See McDevitt, supra note 1, at 360. Congress stated in its findings that "census
data, national polls, and other studies ... documented that people with disabilities, as a
group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially,
Id. at 360 n.3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
vocationally, economically, and educationally."
12101(a)(6)). Congress also stated that disabled individuals:
are a 'discrete and insular minority' who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics ... beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such
individuals' [ability] to participate in, and contribute to, society [sic].
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)). It is estimated that over eight million people
with disabilities desire employment, but are unable to find jobs. See Rose A. Daly-
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Discrimination has prevented individuals with disabilities from
competing equally with others in employment, and has thus led to an
overall decrease in society's productivity and efficiency. 4 To eliminate
this widespread discrimination against disabled individuals and to
ensure their full participation in the workplace, Congress enacted the
ADA.5
The ADA requires employers to provide some "reasonable
accommodation ' 6 to applicants or employees with known physical or
mental disabilities who are otherwise qualified individuals, unless
doing so will create an undue hardship for employers.7 The ADA,
however, fails to specify whether employers are required to help
employees find these reasonable accommodations. 8
The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") suggests that
employers participate in an "interactive process" 9 to help their
employees find reasonable accommodations.' l The EEOC regulations
Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-Worker Participation:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 89, 89 (1994).
4. See McDevitt, supra note 1, at 360 n.3. According to Congress,
The continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an
equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is
justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).
5. See McDevitt, supra note 1, at 361 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)) (Congress
hoped to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities ....
");see also Willis v. Conopco,
Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997).
6. See Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Part I - Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L.
REv. 877, 892 (1997). A reasonable accommodation is a "modification or adjustment to
a workplace process or environment that makes it possible for a qualified person with a
disability to perform essential job functions, such as physical modifications to a work
space, flexible scheduling of duties, or provision of assistive technologies to aid in job
performance." Id.; see also infra note 70 and accompanying text (providing other
definitions of "reasonable accommodations").
7. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1998); infra note 68
(providing the text of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
8. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 748; infra note 70 and accompanying text (providing the
text of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) and discussing the ADA's general guidance regarding
reasonable accommodations).
9. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752 ("The phrase 'interactive process' refers to
discussions between the employer and the disabled employee regarding the employee's
limitations and possible accommodations."); see also infra notes 80-86 and
accompanying text (discussing the interactive process).
10. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3), app. § 1630.9
(1998)); infra note 80 (providing the text of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)); infra note 82
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and interpretive guidance, however, are vague about the extent and
scope of an interactive process." Moreover, the 2EEOC regulations
and interpretive guidance are not binding on courts.
Because of the ambiguities in the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provision and in the EEOC regulations and interpretive guidance,
courts remain divided on the question of whether employers must
participate in an interactive process and, if so, what comprises the
scope of an interactive process. 3 Recently, the Ninth Circuit has
joined several other federal circuits in not requiring employers to
participate with employees in the interactive process of finding a
Other federal circuit courts have
reasonable accommodation. 4
required employers to participate in this process.' 5
This Comment examines the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provision, focusing on whether courts should require employers to
participate in an interactive process of finding a reasonable
accommodation. The Comment first discusses the background of the
ADA 16 and its relation to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"
the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,18 and the EEOC regulations
interpreting the ADA. 19 In doing so, the Comment identifies the
ADA's shortcomings in the treatment of the reasonable accommodation
clause. 2' The Comment then explores the conflicting federal circuit
positions concerning employer involvement in the interactive
process, 21 specifically examining the reasons courts have chosen either

(providing the text of 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9).
11.

See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 753.

Although the EEOC interpretive guidance does

provide a four-part process for employers to follow in the interactive process, see id. at
752, it leaves several questions unanswered, see id. at 753.
12. See Matthew Graham Zagrodzky, Comment, When Employees Become Disabled:
Does the Americans with Disabilities Act Require Consideration of a Transfer as a

Reasonable Accommodation?, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 939, 948 (1997). The United States
Supreme Court stated that "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, [the EEOC Guidelines] do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
13.
14.

See infra Part III.
See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752; infra Part III.A.

15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part IIA-C.
17.
18.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part H.B.

19. See infra Part II.D.
20. See infra Part II.C-D.
21. See infra Part ILA-B.
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to adhere to a traditional burden-shifting framework in ADA cases22 or
to require employer participation in an interactive process.23 Next, the
Comment explains why an interactive process is an overall better
approach, 24 why employees should initiate it, 25 why employees need
only show that they are disabled,26 and why courts should determine
liability based on a good faith participation analysis. 27 Finally, the
Comment proposes that Congress amend the ADA to require an
interactive process and recommends that the EEOC revise its
regulations and interpretive guidance to end the confusion over the
reasonable accommodation issue.2 8
II. BACKGROUND
In the latter half of the twentieth century, Congress has taken
significant steps to end discrimination.29 Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to provide for equal treatment of individuals based
on their membership in specific protected classes. 30 This legislation,
however, failed to protect disabled Americans, as a class, from
discrimination.3 1 The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 attempted to
provide for such protection, but was limited because it only applied to
public sector employees.3 2 Consequently, in 1990, Congress passed
the ADA, which extended protection to individuals in the private sector
from discrimination in all areas of their lives, including employment.3 3
Since Congress enacted the ADA in response to deficiencies in
previous legislation, an understanding of the preceding legislation is
important when analyzing the ADA.

22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part V.A.
25. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
26. See infra Part IV.B.2.
27. See infra Part IV.B.3.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See Zagrodzky, supra note 12, at 942 (citing The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (1994) and The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994)). The
legislation enacted to "reduc[e] the divisive effect of discrimination in America . . . was
not necessarily a new concept .... " Id. For example, "[tihe Civil Rights Act of 1866
(as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991) created a cause a action against race
discrimination ....
Id. at 942 n.23.
30. See infra Part II.A.
3 1. See infra Part II.A.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.C.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 196414 to eliminate
discrimination in several areas of public life. 35 These areas include
public accommodations and facilities, participation in any program that
36
receives federal financial assistance, education, and employment.
Title VII of this Act protects individuals from discrimination in
employment based on their race, color, religion, national origin, and
sex. 37 Specifically, Title VII prohibits employers from considering an
individual's membership in one of the five protected classes when
deciding "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," such as
hiring, firing, and job classification.38
To determine whether an employer has intentionally discriminated
against an individual based on one of the five aforementioned protected
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975e-d, 2000e.
35. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION28 (3d ed. 1993). Congress passed this Act in response to the rising
pressure it faced from the civil rights movement of the 1960s. See generally BARBARA
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw xi-xviii (3d ed. Am.
Bar Ass'n 1996) (discussing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
During this time period, national demonstrations took place to protest discrimination
they experienced in several areas of their lives. See id. at xii. State and local
government representatives repeatedly used violent force against these well-behaved
demonstrators.
See id. Eventually the American people realized "that there was
something radically wrong in their country; that an intolerable injustice existed about
which something had to be done .... Suddenly, .... the time had come for consideration
by the country and by Congress of major civil rights legislation." Id. Thus, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at xiii.
36. See FRIEDMAN& STRICKLER, supranote 35, at 28 n.a. In 1963,
the most immediate and pressing civil-rights problem before the country was
the public-accommodations problem. It was that problem which had given
rise to the 'sit-ins' in the South, and it was the denial of rights in that area in restaurants, hotels and other public places - that seemed least defensible
and most outrageous not only to blacks but to most of the people in the
nation.
LINDEMANN& GROSSMAN, supranote 35, at xiii.
37. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 28. Title VII also created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which is the federal agency charged with
administering and interpreting Title VII's provisions. See id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Under Title VII,
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment . . . or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment . . . because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a). It is also unlawful for employers to "fail or refuse to refer for
employment" or "to classify or refer for employment" an individual based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(b).
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classes in violation of Title VII, courts have allowed plaintiffs to prove
their claims by presenting either direct or circumstantial evidence of
discrimination.39 Plaintiffs often have difficulty providing direct
evidence of discrimination because employers generally avoid making
clearly discriminatory statements or policies.4" Thus, courts developed
the burden-shifting framework for proving discrimination, which
allows plaintiffs to prove discrimination with only circumstantial
evidence.4" Under a burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff has the
39. See LINDEMANN& GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 10-11. Direct evidence "directly
prove[s] a fact of consequence to the determination of an action .
I..."
Id. at 11. It can
consist of facially discriminatory employment policies, such as policies that adversely
treat employees of a certain group. See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial
Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,Pretext,and the "Personality" Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 187
(1997).
It can also consist of employer statements or admissions that are
discriminatory in nature. See id. at 188; Robert J. Smith, The Title VII Pretext Question:
Resolved in Light of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 70 IND. L.J. 281, 282 (1994).
An example of direct evidence is an employer's statement that the employer would never
promote the employee because the employee was black. See Smith, supra, at 282 n.9.
Circumstantial evidence, alternatively, "does not directly prove a fact of consequence
to the determination of an action; rather, it permits the factfinder to infer the existence
of such a fact." LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 11.
An example of
circumstantial evidence is a record demonstrating that an employer has never hired
applicants from a specific group of people although those applicants have been
qualified. See id.
40. See Smith, supra note 39, at 282 ("[A]s employers become increasingly
sophisticated about the law, [direct] evidence is generally unavailable to the plaintiff.
Employers are careful about what they say or document when taking adverse employment
action and will seldom display prejudice blatantly.").
41. See Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation Difference: The
Effect of Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed under Title VII in
Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98, 98 (1997). The United States
Supreme Court initially set forth this burden-shifting framework for Title VII cases in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See id. at 103 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). The Supreme Court created the framework for situations
where an employer has intentionally treated individuals differently because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, see FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at
93, but where the plaintiff has only circumstantial evidence of such discrimination. See
Williams, supra, at 101. Such claims of intentional discrimination are called "disparate
treatment" claims. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 93. The framework
thus allows a plaintiff with no direct proof of intentional discrimination under Title VII
to prove indirectly that his employer discriminated against him based on one of five
aforementioned factors. See Williams, supra, at 101.
[The] framework is designed to enable the factfinder to ascertain whether the
employer-defendant took adverse action against the employee-plaintiff based
on one of the prohibited factors in the statute (e.g., race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin), or whether the employer took such action for some reason
wholly unrelated to these factors.
Id. at 98.
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initial burden of proving a prima facie case of employment
discrimination.42 Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case,
the employer must come forward with a "legitimate,nondiscriminatory
reason for the employer's adverse decision."43 If the employer shows
such a reason, the plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that this
reason was only a pretext for the employer's decision."4 Even if the
plaintiff proves pretext, the employer may still prevail if the trier of fact
is unpersuaded that discrimination was the actual motivation for the
adverse employment action.45 Regardless of whether the employer's
given reason is true, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff. 6

42. See Williams, supra note 41, at 103. To prove a prima facie case of employment
discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff must show:
(1) The plaintiff is a member of the protected class; (2) the plaintiff applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3)
despite the plaintiffs qualifications, the employer rejected the plaintiff; and
(4) after the plaintiff's rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons possessing the plaintiffs
qualifications.
Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792-93).
43. Id.
44. See id. A plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating that the employer's
rebuttal was simply false. See Brodin, supra note 39, at 191. For example, a plaintiff
terminated for excessive absenteeism can show that he was not excessively absent. See
id. A plaintiff may also show pretext by demonstrating that the employer did not treat
people outside of the plaintiffs protected class similarly to the way he treated the
plaintiff. See id. at 191-92; Williams, supra note 41, at 103. For example, a plaintiff
terminated for excessive absenteeism may alternatively show that the employer failed to
terminate other employees who were of a different class but also excessively absent. See
Brodin, supra note 39, at 191.
45. See Williams, supra note 41, at 104-08; see infra note 46 and accompanying text
(discussing how plaintiffs have the ultimate burden of persuasion in Title VII
employment discrimination cases).
46. See Williams, supra note 41, at 104-08. The United States Supreme Court
elaborated on the McDonnell Douglas Title VII burden-shifting framework in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. See
id. In Burdine, the Court explained that the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the employer discriminated against him; the employer
does not have the burden of persuasion, but merely has the burden of producing evidence
that his employment decision "was based on some reason unrelated to the impermissible
factor." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54 (1981). In
Hicks, the Court added to the plaintiffs burden of proof by requiring the plaintiff to
prove that the employer's "proffered reason [for the employment decision] was not the
true reason for the employment decision, and that race was." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993) (emphasis added).
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B. FederalRehabilitationAct of 1973

Although Title VII applies to several classes of people, it does not
protect the class of disabled people because they are not protected as a
class under the statute's plain meaning.47
To remedy this
shortcoming, Congress passed the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973
("Rehabilitation Act")48 to prohibit public sector employers from
discriminating against mentally and physically disabled individuals.4 9
Under the Rehabilitation Act, disabled individuals include those
workers with physical or mental impairments that limit one or more
major life activities,5" such as walking, seeing, or working. 1
47. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 63. Title VII will only protect
disabled individuals from employment discrimination if employers also discriminate
against them because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See id.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
49. See FRIEDMAN& STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 960. The Rehabilitation Act covers
employees of the federal government, the United States Postal Service, federal
contractors, and employers who accept federal funds. See id. The Rehabilitation Act
provides that:
Any contract in excess of $10,000 entered into by any Federal department or
agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services...
for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that the party
contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and
advance in employment qualified individuals with disabilities.
29 U.S.C. § 793(a). The Rehabilitation Act also states that:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . .
shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service.
Id. § 794.
It should also be noted that the Rehabilitation Act originally prohibited
discrimination against "handicapped" individuals.
See ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR.,
DISABILITYDISCRIMINATION N EMPLOYMENT LAw 17 (1995).

Several disabled individuals

and groups representing them, however, objected to the use of the word "handicap." See
id. (citing S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 21 and H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 51 (1990) (Education and Labor Committee)). Thus, when
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, it used the term "disability," rather than "handicap."
See id. In 1992, consequently, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act, replacing
each of the references to "handicap" with "disability." See id. (citing Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, §§ 102(f)(2)(B), 102(f)(3), and 102(p), 106
Stat. 4344, 4348, 4349, 4356-58 (1992)).
50. See Zagrodzky, supra note 12, at 943. An individual with a disability is "any
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
51. See 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1998) ("'Major life activities' means functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, .
[and] working .... ").
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When originally enacted, the Rehabilitation Act failed to define what
The
constituted discrimination against disabled individuals.5 2
regulations for the portion of the Rehabilitation Act applying to
employers who receive federal assistance,53 however, provided
guidance by requiring such employers to provide "reasonable
accommodations" to qualified individuals with disabilities.54 When
drafting the ADA, legislators used the reasonable accommodation
language from the Rehabilitation Act regulations for the ADA's
definition of discrimination.5 5 Consequently, in 1992, Congress
amended the Rehabilitation Act to apply the standards from the newly
56
enacted ADA, including the reasonable accommodation requirement.
Mirroring the ADA, employers covered under the Rehabilitation Act
are liable for discrimination for failure to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities.57 The regulations
52. See Rosalie K. Murphy, Note, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment
DiscriminationUnder Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
1607, 1616 (1991); see also supra note 49 (providing portions of Rehabilitation Act
prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals).
53. The Office of Civil Rights at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) initially issued these model regulations. See Murphy, supranote 52, at 1608 n.9
(1991). The Department of Justice took over this responsibility in 1980. See id.
54. See Zagrodzky, supra note 12, at 944; Murphy, supra note 52, at 1616. The
regulations provide that:
(a) A [covered employer] shall make reasonable accommodation to the known
physical or mental limitation of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant
or employee
(d) A [covered employer] may not deny an employment opportunity to a
qualified handicapped employee or applicant if the basis for the denial is the
need to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental limitations
of the employee or applicant.
45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1996).
55. See BURGDORF, supra note 49, at 276 ("Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) established the first explicit statutory reasonable accommodation requirement
in the employment context and provided considerably more statutory guidance about the
requirement's context and implications."); infra note 68 (providing the text of ADA's
definition of discrimination).
56. See Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
794(d)); BURGDORF, supra note 49, at 72 (quoting Pub. L. No. 102-569, §§ 503(b)(g),
505(c)(d), 506(d), 106 Stat. 4424, 4427, 4428 (1992) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g)
(§ 501), 793(d) (§ 503), and 794(d) (§ 504)) ("[I]n complaints alleging employment
discrimination [under the Rehabilitation Act], the standards under ADA Titles I and V
that relate to employment are '[t]he standards to be used in determining whether this
section has been violated."') (third alteration in quoting source).
57. See Zagrodzky, supra note 12, at 943 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1998)). Federal
employers must provide these accommodations to the extent that the disabled workers
can "compete for... position[s] as though there [were] no disability." See id. at 944
(citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979)).

522

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 30

for the Rehabilitation Act, however, failed to mention the interactive
process that the EEOC suggests in its ADA regulations.58
C. The ADA

The Rehabilitation Act suffers from diminished efficacy since it
applies only to public sector employees, federal contractors, and
private sector employers receiving federal funds.5 9 In 1990, Congress
enacted the ADA to extend discrimination coverage to disabled
workers 60 in the private sector. 61 Congress used much of the language
from the Rehabilitation Act in drafting the ADA because the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA both apply to disabled workers. 62 As
such, the ADA defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment
that limits one or more of a person's major life activities. 63
58. See supra note 54 (providing the text of the Rehabilitation Act regulations). It
should be noted, however, that the regulations for the portion of the Rehabilitation Act
applying to government contractors and subcontractors, also apply the same standards
as Title I of the ADA as well as the respective EEOC regulations and interpretive
guidance. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.1; see supra note 49 (providing the text of section of
Rehabilitation Act applying to federal contractors). These regulations provide:
Except as otherwise provided in this part, this part does not apply a lesser
standard than the standards applied under title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, or the regulations issued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission pursuant to that title. The Interpretive Guidance on
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . may be relied upon for
guidance in interpreting the parallel provisions of this part.
Id. § 60-741.1(c)(1) (citations omitted). Thus, although the regulations for employers
receiving federal financial assistance do not suggest an interactive process, see supra
note 54 (providing the text of these regulations), the regulations for government
contractors and subcontractors arguably do make such a suggestion. See infra notes 7386 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's regulations and interpretive guidance
for the ADA).
59. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 960; Zagrodzky, supra note 12, at
943.
60. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (defining "disability" under the ADA);
infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (defining "disability" under the Rehabilitation
Act).
61. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 960. In addition to protecting
disabled individuals from discrimination in employment, the ADA prohibits disability
discrimination in public accommodations, transportation, and communication.
See
McDevitt, supra note 1, at 360-61 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994)
(communication); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (employment); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1214112165 (transportation); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (public accommodations)).
62. See FRIEDMAN &STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 961.
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Under the ADA, a disability is "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such
an impairment."
Id.; see also supra note 50 (defining "disability" under the
Rehabilitation Act).
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Title I of the ADA prohibits covered employers 64 from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities.65
Qualified
individuals with disabilities are applicants or employees who can
perform the essential functions of a position with or without a
reasonable accommodation.66 With regard to essential functions, the
ADA grants great deference to the employer's judgment in such
matters. 67 The ADA defines discrimination as failing to make
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of a disabled individual, unless providing such accommodations
will create an undue hardship on the employer. 68 An undue hardship
is an action that causes an employer great difficulty or expense when
considered with regard to the employer's overall business needs.6 9
64. Since July 5, 1994, "[t]he term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current of preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person .... " 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
65. See id. § 12112(a). The ADA specifically states: "No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." Id.
66. See id. § 12111(8) (defining a "qualified individual with a disability").
67. See id. ("[C]onsideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what
functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job."). See,e.g., Frix v. Florida
Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1027, 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that "lifting items
weighing more than 25 pounds is an essential function of [a] storeroom coordinator
position"); Gore v. GTE S., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1564, 1572 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (holding
that "regular and reliable attendance is an essential function of the job of telephone
operator"); McDaniel v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1482, 1489 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
(holding that security clearance was an essential function of a position at the U.S.
Department of Energy).
68. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1998).
Discrimination
includes:
Not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity ....

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
69. See id. § 12111(10). Undue hardship is:
An action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light
of... (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility ... involved in the provision
of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such
facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such
accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial
resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered
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Rather than defining exactly what an employer must do to comply
with the reasonable accommodation requirement, the ADA simply
gives examples of what a reasonable accommodation might possibly
include.7 ° Congress failed to articulate many important details
concerning reasonable accommodations, such as whether the employer
or the employee must request a reasonable accommodation, how the
party must request the accommodation, or when the party must make
such a request.7' Thus, while an employer may know that he must
provide a reasonable accommodation, the ADA gives the employer
little guidance about determining the reasonable accommodation,
particularly the extent to which the employer must be involved in the
process of finding the accommodation.72
D. EEOC Regulations

Congress charged the EEOC with issuing regulations to carry out
the goals of the ADA* 3 These regulations further clarify the ADA by
defining and elaborating on several of the terms used in the ADA,
including "physical or mental impairment, 74 "major life activity, 75
entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and
location of facilities; and (iv) the type of operation . . . of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of
the facility ... in question to the covered entity.
Id.
70. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 748. According to the ADA,
The term 'reasonable accommodation' may include(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). "In general, an 'accommodation' is the consideration of making
changes in usual work rules, or terms or conditions of employment to enable a disabled
person to work." Hope A. Comisky, Guidelines for Successfully Engaging in the
Interactive Process to Find a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 13 LAB. L.J. 499, 499 (1998).
71. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 753; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
72. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752-53.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (stating that the EEOC "shall issue regulations . . . to
carry out this subchapter...").
74. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998) (defining "physical or mental impairment" as
"any physiological disorder, . . . cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss" that
affects one or more of certain body systems, including the neurological, reproductive, or
digestive systems, or "any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning

1999]

Determining Reasonable Accommodations

"substantially limits,

' 76

and "reasonable accommodation.,

77

With

regard to reasonable accommodations, the EEOC regulations, like the
ADA, discuss potential accommodations in terms of what they might
include.78
The regulations provide some additional guidance
concerning employer participation in the process of finding a
reasonable accommodation.7 9 The regulations suggest that "it may be
necessary for [an employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process
with the qualified individual with a disability" to determine whether a
reasonable accommodation exists or to select a specific reasonable
accommodation.8"
The EEOC has also issued an "interpretive guidance" appendix to
its ADA regulations.8 According to the appendix, an employer has a
duty to make reasonable efforts to determine an appropriate accommodation once an employee has requested an accommodation.8 2 The
interpretive guidance specifically states that employers need only

disabilities.").
75. See id. § 1630.2(i) (defining "major life activities" as "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working").
76. See id. § 1630.20) (defining "substantially limits" as "[u]nable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or ...
[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to . .. the average
").
person in the general population ....
77. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).
78. See id.; see also supra note 70 (providing reasonable accommodation language
from the ADA).
79. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752; see also infra note 80 (providing the text of 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).
80. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752. The regulations, in full, provide that a reasonable
accommodation may require an employer:
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary
for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the
qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This
process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability
and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those
limitations.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
81. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9).
82. See id. The interpretive guidance provides:
Once a qualified individual with a disability has requested provision of a
reasonable accommodation, the employer must make a reasonable effort to
The appropriate reasonable
determine the appropriate accommodation.
accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that
involves both the employer and the qualified individual with a disability.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
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accommodate "known" disabilities.83
The guidance notes the
importance of communication between the employer and employee in
order to determine a reasonable accommodation.84
The interpretive guidance further suggests that employers follow 85a
four-step process to determine a proper reasonable accommodation.
The suggested process involves (1) the employer analyzing a job's
essential functions; (2) the employer consulting with the. disabled
individual to determine the employee's limitations and the ways to
accommodate those limitations; (3) the employer further consulting
with the disabled employee to weigh the potential effectiveness of the
conceivable accommodations; and (4) the ultimate selection of a
reasonable accommodation that does not create an undue hardship for
the employer.86
83. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9. The interpretive guidance provides:
Employers are obligated to make reasonable accommodations only to the
physical or mental limitations resulting from the disability of a qualified
individual with a disability that is known to the employer. Thus, an employer
would not be expected to accommodate disabilities of which it is unaware. If
an employee with a known disability is having difficulty performing his or
her job, an employer may inquire whether the employee is in need of a
reasonable accommodation. In general, however, it is the responsibility of
the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation
is needed.
Id. § 1630.9 (emphasis added).
84. See Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (7th Cir.
1996). The interpretive guidance of the regulations provide:
[1]n some instances neither the individual requesting the accommodation nor
the employer can readily identify the appropriate accommodation.
For
example, the individual needing the accommodation may not know enough
about the equipment used by the employer or the exact nature of the work site
to suggest an appropriate accommodation. Likewise, the employer may not
know enough about the individual's disability or the limitations
that
disability would impose on the performance of the job to suggest an
appropriate accommodation.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9).
85. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 756 (Fletcher, J. dissenting).
86. See id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (discussing the interpretive guidance to the
EEOC regulations). The interpretive guidance suggests a four-step interactive process:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and essential
functions; (2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the
precise job-related limitations imposed by the individual's disability and how
those limitations could be overcome with a reasonable accommodation; (3) In
consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify potential
accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would have in enabling the
individual to perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) Consider
the preference of the individual to be accommodated and select and implement
the accommodation that is most appropriate for the employee and the
employer.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
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III. DISCUSSION
Although the EEOC developed its regulations to eliminate some of
the ambiguities in the ADA, the regulations instead have added to the
confusion surrounding the interpretation of the ADA.' 7 By further
defining the language of the ADA, the regulations increase the duties
on employers by suggesting that employers actively participate in the
process of finding a reasonable accommodation.88 Nevertheless, the
regulations do not provide necessary details about this interactive
process, such as who is liable for a break-down in the process and
when the appropriate party incurs such liability.89 Furthermore, these
regulations are not legally binding.9"
Because of this lack of clarity, courts have ruled differently on the
Some
issue of employer participation in an interactive process.9
courts do not defer to the regulations92 and consequently do not require
employers to participate in the EEOC's suggested interactive process. 93
These courts have instead applied the traditional Title VII burdenshifting formula 94 to ADA cases, requiring disabled individuals to

show the existence of actual accommodations as part of their prima
facie cases. 95 Under the burden-shifting formula, employees first
must prove that a reasonable accommodation is possible.96 The
burden then shifts to the employers to show that providing such an
87. See Howard A. Simon & Alison J. Morbey, The ADA's "Interactive Process" for
Determining Reasonable Accommodations: How Much Interaction is Enough?, 24
EMPLOYEERELATIONSL.J. 5, 6-7 (1998).

88. See supra text accompanying notes 78-86 (discussing employers' suggested
active role in determining appropriate accommodations).
89. See Simon & Morbey, supra note 87, at 7; supra note 9 and accompanying text
(discussing the "interactive process" in which employers must engage).
90. See Zagrodzky, supra note 12, at 948 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)) (explaining that courts do not consistently rely on
EEOC regulations for the ADA when interpreting the ADA because the Supreme Court has
instructed that the EEOC guidelines are an administrative interpretation of the ADA and
thus are "'not controlling upon courts by reason of their authority ... .
91. See Simon & Morbey, supra note 87, at 7.
92. For a discussion of the various reasons courts do not defer to the regulations, see
infra Part III.A.
93. See infra Part III.A (discussing cases that do not require employer participation in
the interactive process).
94. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing the burden-shifting
framework).
95. See infra Part III.A (discussing cases that do not require an interactive process);
infra note 99 para. 3 (comparing an ADA plaintiff in a court using a burden-shifting
frame-work to an ADA plaintiff in a court requiring an interactive process).
96. See White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that
the plaintiff must "produce evidence sufficient to make a facial showing that
accommodation is possible").
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accommodation would create an undue hardship for the employer.97
The employees must then ultimately show that they could perform the
job and that the employers failed to provide the accommodation.98
Other courts, alternatively, have reasoned that the ADAsubstantially
differs from Title VII, and thus have refused to apply the burdenshifting framework. 99 These courts place a lesser burden on
employees by requiring employers to work with disabled employees,
through an interactive process, to find reasonable accommodations.1 0
Thus, while designed to clarify the vague language in the ADA, the
EEOC regulations and court interpretations of the Act have added to,
rather than eliminated, the controversy surrounding the ADA's
reasonable accommodation provision. 1'

97. See id.
98. See id. (stating that the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the employeeplaintiff).
99. See infra Part II.B (discussing cases that require employer participation in the
interactive process). Under a traditional burden-shifting framework, to prove a prima
facie case, a plaintiff must first show that he is a member of a protected class. See
Williams, supra note 41, at 130. Under Title VII, this ordinarily is not problematic
because a plaintiff's membership in a protected class is generally uncontested. See id. at
131. Furthermore, if such membership is not controversial, Title VII plaintiffs usually
do not have to spend extravagant resources proving that they are members of a specific
class. See id. at 132. For example, when a woman is trying to prove sex discrimination
under Title VII, she generally does not have a problem providing evidence that she is a
woman. See id. at 131.
With the ADA, however, a plaintiff might face more obstacles to proving membership
in a protected class. See id. In fact, class membership may be the only issue in dispute.
See id. Under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that he is a "qualified individual with a
disability." See id. Because the definition of this "class" is not as clear as those of the
five Title VII protected classes, plaintiffs claiming discrimination under the ADA often
must spend extravagant resources to show their membership in this class. See id. at
132.
Consequently, ADA plaintiffs typically face "unprecedented and seemingly
insurmountable proof barriers as a result of this complexity." Id. at 133.
For example, under the Title VII burden-shifting framework, an ADA plaintiff may not
satisfy his burden of proof by merely showing that he has a disability. See Barnett v.
U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1998). Instead, in addition to showing that
he is disabled, the ADA plaintiff would also have to show that a specific reasonable
accommodation existed at the time of the plaintiff's disability, which the employer
failed to consider. See id. Under this framework, if the plaintiff fails to show the
existence of such an accommodation, the plaintiff has not satisfied his requisite burden.
See id.
100. See infra Part III.B (discussing cases requiring employer participation in the
interactive process). These courts do not require ADA plaintiffs to prove that a specific
accommodation exists which the employer failed to consider. See infra Part III.B.
Rather, they merely require the plaintiff to be disabled; once the employer knows this,
the employer must then participate in an interactive process with this disabled worker to
find him a reasonable accommodation. See infra Part III.B.
101. See Simon & Morbey, supra note 87, at 6.
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Circuit courts are split over whether to require employers to
participate in the interactive process of finding a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA. 10 2 Consequently, covered individuals
and entities are in limbo about their rights and responsibilities. °3
Three federal circuit courts have not followed the EEOC's
recommendations suggesting employer participation in the interactive
process.1 4 Alternatively, three other federal circuits have deferred to
the EEOC, and thereby have mandated employer participation in the
interactive process. 0 5
A. Courts Not Requiring Employer Participationin the Interactive
Process
Circuit courts not requiring employer participation in the interactive
process have not deferred to the EEOC's regulations suggesting such
participation. 0 6 Rather, they have applied a traditional burden-shifting
framework used in Title VII cases.'0 7 Although these courts provide
different reasons for not deferring to the EEOC regulations, all agree
that courts should not require employers to participate in an interactive
process. 108

In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit did not require an employer to
participate in the interactive process of finding a reasonable
accommodation for a disabled employee.' 0 9 In this case, Barnett, an
employee of U.S. Air, injured his back in 1990 while handling cargo
at work. "1 0 Because his back injury hindered him from performing his
cargo handling position, he used his seniority to obtain a position in
the mail room. 11'
Two years later, while pulling a mail cart for his mail room position,
he again injured his back." 2 At that time, his doctor prohibited him
from performing any strenuous work, such as bending excessively,
102. Seeid. at 7.
103. See infra Part III.A-B (discussing the split in the Circuit courts).
104. See infra Part III.A (discussing decisions by the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits).
105. See infra Part III.B (discussing decisions by the Third, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits).
106. See infra notes 109-43 and accompanying text (discussing decisions by the
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
107. See infra notes 109-43 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 109-43 and accompanying text.
109. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 752-53 (9th Cir. 1998).
110. See id. at 746.
111. See id.
112. See id.
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twisting, turning, standing or sitting for long periods of time, and
from lifting twenty-five pounds or more." 3 Fearing that he would
lose his mail room job because of U.S. Air's established seniority
bidding system, Barnett asked his manager for an ADA
accommodation to allow him to remain in the mail room." 4 For the
next five months, U.S. Air allowed Barnett to remain in the mailroom,
but subsequently placed Barnett on job injury leave because he was
unable to perform his cargo position duties. 5 One month later, U.S.
Air stopped paying his salary.' 16 Barnett then requested that U.S. Air
provide special lifting equipment or modify the cargo position to avoid
but U.S. Air refused to make such
the lifting requirement,
7
accommodations." 1
The Ninth Circuit applied a burden-shifting framework" 8 and held
that Barnett failed to satisfy his burden of proof because he did not
show the existence of a specific position to serve as a reasonable
accommodation." 9 In deciding this, the court relied on previous Ninth
Circuit decisions requiring plaintiffs in ADA cases to prove that they
"can perform the essential functions of the job with or without
reasonable accommodation."' 120 The court expanded this previously
defined burden to now require plaintiffs to show that at least one
specific reasonable accommodation existed at the time the employer
learned of12the
employee's limitations, 121 but that the employer failed to
2
it.
pursue
113. See id.
114. See id. at 746-47.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 747.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 748-49; see also supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the burden-shifting framework).
119. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752.
120. Id. at 749 (citing Cooper v. Neiman Marcus Group, 125 F.3d 786, 790 (9th Cir.
1997); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996)).
121. See id. "In order to be reasonable, an accommodation cannot be merely
hypothetical." Id. The court also referred to Foreman v. Babcock Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d
800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997);
Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563-64 (7th Cir. 1996);
Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir. 1996); and White
v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995), which all placed the burden on
plaintiffs to show that actual accommodations existed at the time period in question, but
which the employers refused to provide as part of their prima facie cases. See id.
122. See id. Only after the plaintiff has shown that this specific accommodation
exists does the burden shift to the employer to show that providing such an
See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §
accommodation would pose an undue hardship.
12112(b)(5)(A) (1994)).
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The court further held that an employer's failure to participate in the
interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation does not create
an independent basis for liability under the ADA. 123 The court.stated
that the EEOC regulations use permissive, not mandatory, language
concerning an employer's participation in the interactive process.' 24
Such language also warns employers of potential liability which might
result from failure to participate in the process, but does not in and of
itself form an independent basis for employer liability.' 25 The court
noted that holding employers automatically liable for failing to
participate in the interactive process is irrational because it potentially
subjects employers who successfully provided reasonable
accommodations to liability. 2 6
The court also expressed its
apprehension about how a rule imposing automatic employer liability
would work, noting that the point at which an employer incurs process
liability is unclear. 127 The court did, however, recognize that an
employer's participation in the interactive process may lead to
"optimal" reasonable accommodations and thus may be important in
determining liability. 128
Nevertheless, the court held that the
employer's failure to make reasonable accommodations, not the
process of ascertaining these accommodations, ultimately determines
liability. 129
The dissent disagreed with the majority's view of the EEOC's
language concerning the interactive process. 30 According to the
dissent, while the EEOC regulations state that it "may" be necessary
123. See id. at 752.
124. See id. The court stated, "[t]he regulations, however, state only that an
interactive process 'may be necessary.' The regulations do not state that it is
necessary." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1998)) (emphasis added by the court).
125. See id. The permissive language used in the EEOC Regulations "serves as a
warning to employers that a failure to engage in an interactive process might expose
them to liability for failing to make reasonable accommodation," but "do[es] not . . .
create independent liability for the employer for failing to engage in ritualized
discussions with the employee to find a reasonable accommodation." Id.
126. See id. at 753.
127. See id. Specifically, the court asked whether an employer would incur liability
for "fail[ing] to perform one of the recommended steps in the interactive process" or for
being "merely slow" in its involvement in the process. Id.
128. See id.
129. See id. The court noted that the proper "inquiry is whether the employer failed
to make required reasonable accommodations for the employee. A failure to engage in an
interactive process may be relevant to that inquiry; it is not a separate inquiry." Id.
130. See id. at 755 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). The dissent then specifically cited the
EEOC's suggested four-step requirements for the interactive process. See id. at 756
(Fletcher, J., dissenting); see also supra note 86 (providing the text of EEOC's
suggested four-step process).
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for employers to participate in the interactive process, the use of "may"
merely refers to limited situations that do not warrant employer
participation.31 The dissent argued that in a world faced with
informational barriers, courts should require employer and employee
participation in the interactive process because both parties ultimately
benefit from shared information about reasonable accommodations. 32
Furthermore, the dissent maintained that a mandatory interactive
process would not unduly burden employers because an employer's
participation may be as minor
as simple communication with the
133
problem.
the
about
employee
Similar to the majority opinion in Barnett, 134 the Eleventh Circuit
does not require an employer to participate in the interactive process of
finding a reasonable accommodation for a disabled employee.'35 The
131. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
According to the
dissent, "[o]nly if it is clear that a reasonable accommodation is available, or clear that
there is no reasonable accommodation available, may an employer not initiate an
interactive process with the disabled employee. In cases where the accommodation may
be possible, the interactive process is required." Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting). The
dissent also argued that the EEOC's use of "mandatory language" in the interpretative
guidance concerning reasonable accommodations further shows its intent for employer
participation in the interactive process. See id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 755-56 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
If this were an ideal world peopled by well intentioned employers, clever
employees and no informational barriers, the use of an interactive process to
determine whether a reasonable accommodation exists could be optional. We
do not live in such a world. Some employers are unwilling to accommodate
disabled workers.
Some employees can propose only limited ideas for
accommodation because they lack sufficient knowledge, skill or ability to
identify a workable accommodation. Informational barriers are high ...
Determinations of reasonable accommodations also require information about
the worker's disability and the limitations that the disability imposes. Since
the determination of a reasonable accommodation usually will require the
sharing of information between employer and employee . . . the interactive

process is not optional except in the rare cases where the answer is clear.
Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 756 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 746-54; see also supra notes 109-29 and accompanying text
(discussing the majority opinion in Barnett).
135. See Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997). Willis was
an employee at Lever Brothers ("Conopco") and was sensitive to enzymes in the laundry
detergent she packaged. See id. at 283. Conopco attempted to accommodate Willis'
sensitivities by minimizing her exposure to the enzymes, including transferring her to a
new position. See id. Willis provided Conopco with a doctor's letter stating that she
suffered from an immune system abnormality and thus could no longer work at her new
assignment. See id. She refused to return to work, and requested that Conopco either
reassign her to a new building or enclose the area in which she worked. See id. After a
Conopco-arranged doctor determined that Willis was able to work at her present
position, Conopco fired Willis for failing to show for work. See id. at 284. The
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Eleventh Circuit has also adopted a burden-shifting framework in
which the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of producing evidence of
the availability of a reasonable accommodation which would have
enabled the employee to successfully perform the employee's job.'36
The court specifically stated its fear of potential employer liability for
failing to engage in the interactive process in cases where an
investigation into reasonable accommodations "would have been
fruitless."' 13 7 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the employers' fear of
liability will often provide enough incentive for them to partake in the
interactive process before firing a disabled worker. 38 The court also
found that the punitive approach of automatic employer liability for
failure to participate in the interactive process is inconsistent with the
basic remedial goals of the ADA, which work to "ensur[e] that those
with disabilities can fully participate in all aspects of society, including
the workplace."' 3 9
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has not required an employer to
participate in the interactive process to find a reasonable
accommodation for a disabled employee. 140 By also applying a
burden-shifting framework,141 the Tenth Circuit rejected the EEOC's
recommendations that employers engage in the interactive process. 142
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of
Conopco. See id. at 287.
136. See id. at 284-85. Because Willis failed to present competent evidence that a
reasonable accommodation existed, she failed to meet her requisite burden of proof. See
id. at 286.
137. Id. at 285 (quoting Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 448
(11th Cir. 1996)).
138. See id.
139. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994)) (stating further that the ADA is "not
intended to punish employers for behaving callously if, in fact, no accommodation for
the employee's disability could reasonably have been made").
140. See White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995). White, an
employee who worked for York International Corporation ("York") in positions
requiring lifting and continuous standing, injured his ankle on two non-work related
occasions. See id. at 358-59. After undergoing surgery for this, White presented York
with a doctor's note restricting his physical activities to: "work as tolerated; no
standing for longer than four hours; and no lifting more than fifteen pounds." Id. at 359.
After a York-appointed doctor subsequently determined that White was unable to return
to work, York terminated White. See id. York argued that it terminated White because of
his excessive absenteeism and because they were unaware of possible reasonable
accommodations for his disability. See id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's granting of summary judgment in favor of York. See id. at 363.
141. See id. at 361. The court noted that White did not meet his required burden of
proof by making "bald conclusions" that he could have performed his job with
reasonable accommodations. See id. at 362. Instead, White needed to provide evidence
of possible accommodations. See id.
142. Seeid. at 363.
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The court stated that EEOC recommendations are not statutory
requirements and, if an employer chooses to follow them, they only
suggest employer participation once an employee has proven himself
to be "qualified."

'4 3

B. Courts Requiring Employer Participationin the Interactive Process
Courts requiring employer participation in the interactive process
defer to the EEOC's regulations recommending participation. 44 These
courts differ regarding whether the employer or employee bears the
initial burden of commencing the interactive process, but all agree that
courts should require employers and employees to partake in such a
process.' 45
The Seventh Circuit has held that the employer and employee must
work together in the interactive process to determine whether a specific
reasonable accommodation exists. 46
' An employer becomes obligated
to participate in the interactive process once an employee notifies the
employer of his disability.14' The Seventh Circuit has imposed a duty
on the employer and employee to participate in the interactive process
"in good faith" and "to make reasonable efforts to help the other party
determine what specific accommodations are necessary."'' 48 The party
143. See id.
To be "qualified," an employee must propose a reasonable
accommodation, which White failed to do. See id. Thus, even if York chose to follow
the non-statutory EEOC recommendations, a court would not require York to participate
in the interactive process, as White had not proven himself to be "qualified." See id.
144. See infra notes 146-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Third, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits' practice of .requiring some level of employer involvement in the
interactive process outlined by the EEOC).
145. See infra notes 146-67 and accompanying text.
146. See Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir.
1996). Beck, a secretary at the University of Wisconsin ("University"), took four
leaves of absence from her job, first because of various medical conditions, and later
because of osteoarthritis and depression. See id. at 1132-33. The second and third time
she returned to work, she presented a doctor's note restricting her activities or
suggesting that the University provide a reasonable accommodation for her condition.
See id. While the University repeatedly tried to accommodate her illness, Beck did not
provide the necessary information they requested to determine such accommodations.
See id. at 1133. After her fourth leave of absence, Beck sued the University, claiming
discrimination for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See id.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
University. See id. at 1137.
147. See id. at 1134-35.
148. Id. at 1135. Failure to act in good faith includes obstructing or delaying the
interactive process. See id. "A party that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or
response, may also be acting in bad faith." Id Failure to provide information that only
one party can provide can be considered an obstruction of the interactive process. See
id. at 1136.
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that fails to do so is liable for causing the breakdown in the interactive
process. 14 9 The Seventh Circuit specifically cited the EEOC
recommendations, noting that they anticipate that a lack of shared
information among employers and employees may cause such a
breakdown. 150 Accordingly, once a trial court can isolate
the cause of
5
the breakdown, it should then assign responsibility.1 1
The Seventh Circuit has further expanded the employer's duty to
participate in the interactive process.' 52 In cases involving mentally ill
employees, an employer must both initiate and participate in the
interactive process if the employer has reason to assume the employee
may need an accommodation.' 53 In so holding, the54 Seventh Circuit
also rejected the traditional burden-shifting method.

149. See id. at 1135. Because the University repeatedly attempted to accommodate
Beck, and requested medical information from Beck in order to better accommodate her,
it satisfied its part of the interactive process. See id. at 1136. Because Beck, however,
was the only party who could provide such information and failed to do so, the court held
that Beck caused the breakdown in the interactive process. See id. at 1137. Thus,
although the University did not provide a reasonable accommodation for Beck, it was
not liable because it did not cause the breakdown of the interactive process. See id.
150. See id. at 1135-36 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1998)).
151. See id. at 1135.
152. See Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (7th
Cir. 1996).
153. See id. at 1286. Bultemeyer, a custodian for the Fort Wayne Community
Schools ("FWCS"), had taken disability leave from his limited-duty custodial job for
serious mental illness. See id. at 1281-82. After notifying FWCS that he was ready to
return to work and touring the new school where FWCS would place him, Bultemeyer
expressed anxiety that working at such a large school would be too stressful. See id. at
1282. Bultemeyer obtained a doctor's letter suggesting placement in a less stressful
school, but FWCS had already terminated Bultemeyer for failure to report to work. See
id.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment in
favor of FWCS. See id. at 1287. The court cited its holding in Beck, requiring both
parties to work together to determine a reasonable accommodation, and stated:
•[P]roperly participating in the interactive process means that an employer
cannot expect an employee to read its mind and know that he or she must
specifically say "I want a reasonable accommodation," particularly when the
employee has a mental illness. The employer has to meet the employee halfway, and if it appears that the employee may need an accommodation but
doesn't know how to ask for it, the employer should do what it can to help.
Id. at 1285 (citing Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135).
Because Bultemeyer was mentally ill, and because FWCS knew this, FWCS had the duty
to initiate the process of finding a reasonable accommodation for Bultemeyer. See id. at
1286. Because FWCS neither considered the doctor's note nor inquired with Bultemeyer
or his doctor about how to reasonably accommodate Bultemeyer, FWCS acted in bad
faith and thus caused the interactive process to break down. See id.
154. See id. at 1283-84. The court reasoned that it should treat disparate treatment
claims differently than reasonable accommodation claims. See id. at 1283. Because
Bultemeyer's claim was regarding reasonable accommodation, the disparate treatment
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The Fifth Circuit rulings are not as broad as the Seventh Circuit's,
but they do require an employer to participate in, though not initiate,
the interactive process.' 5 5 The Fifth Circuit specifically rejected the
expansive view of the Seventh Circuit and required employer
participation in the interactive process only after the employee has
initially requested an accommodation.' 5 6 Moreover, the court did not
allow an exception for mentally ill employees. 57 The court noted the
importance of distinguishing between an employer's knowledge of a
disability and an employer's knowledge of limitations caused by the
disability.'58 Specifically, the court held that an employer only has a
duty to reasonably accommodate an employee when the employer
knows of limitations resulting from the employee's disability, because
the ADA "requires employers to reasonably accommodate limitations,
not disabilities.' ' 159 The court also emphasized that the EEOC's
interpretative guidance to the ADA supports such a distinction because
this guidance specifically states160that some impairments may limit
certain individuals but not others.
burden-shifting model is both "unnecessary and inappropriate." See id. at 1284.
155. See Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).
Taylor was office manager for Principal Financial Group ("Principal Mutual"). See id. at
158. Taylor's bipolar and anxiety disorders negatively affected his productivity at
work. See id. at 158-59. In discussions with Principal Mutual about this productivity
problem, Taylor mentioned that he suffered from mental illnesses, yet never stated that
this prevented him from doing his job. See id. at 159. When Principal Mutual
ultimately fired Taylor for unsatisfactory productivity, Taylor sued under the ADA,
alleging Principal Mutual's failure to reasonably accommodate him. See id. at 161. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of
Principal Mutual. See id. at 166.
156. See id. at 165. The court stated, "it is the employee's initial request for an
accommodation which triggers the employer's obligation to participate in the
interactive process of determining one." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9) (1998)).
Because Taylor failed to inform Principal Mutual of the limitations caused by his illness,
and instead merely informed them of his disability, Taylor failed to "trigger" Principal
Mutual's duty to participate in the interactive process. See id. at 165.
157. See id. The court refused the mentally ill exception seen in Bultemeyer because
an employee's health-care providers, not the employer, "are best positioned to diagnose
an employee's disabilities, limitations, and possible accommodations." Id.; see also
supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Bultemeyer decision).
158. See Taylor, 93 F.3d at 164.
159. Id. To illustrate its point, the court provided the following example: while a
hearing impairment is a disability, it probably would not limit an assembly line worker
in his ability to do the job, but probably would limit a telephone operator in her ability
to do the job. See id. Thus, while both workers suffer from a disability, only the
telephone operator requires a reasonable accommodation to allow the worker to perform
the essential functions of the job. See id.
160. See id. The EEOC's interpretive guidance states that "[s]ome impairments may
be disabling for particular individuals, but not for others, depending on the stage of the
disease or disorder, the presence of other impairments that combine to make the
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Although arising in the context of the Rehabilitation Act cause of
action, the Third Circuit also requires employers to participate in the
interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation.16 ' The court
held that both parties have a duty to participate in good faith in the
interactive process under the Rehabilitation Act. 162 The court
highlighted the relevance of ADA case law to Rehabilitation Act
decisions, noting that in 1992, the Rehabilitation Act incorporated the
"reasonable accommodation" section from the ADA. 163 Relying on
several other circuit decisions, the Third Circuit required employer
participation once notified of the need for an accommodation in ADA
cases. 164 The court reasoned that an employer's participation will
better serve the employee because it will provide the employee with
information otherwise difficult or impossible for him to obtain. 65 It
then argued that the interactive process more effectively furthers the
goals of both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA by securing access to
employment for the disabled. 66 The court also noted that, even under
fear liability where
the interactive process, employers need 6not
7
reasonable accommodations are impossible. 1

impairment disabling, or any number of other factors." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.20)).
161. See Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418-20 (3d Cir. 1997). Mengine, a
disabled letter carrier for the United States Postal Service ("Postal Service"), requested
reassignment to a position requiring less strenuous work. See id. at 416-17. He
objected to the Postal Service's original employment offers because they did not meet
his physical limitations. See id. at 417. He later identified possible suitable positions,
but was informed that they were not vacant. See id. Eventually, Mengine filed for
disability retirement, and sued the Postal Service for failure to reasonably accommodate
him under the Rehabilitation Act. See id. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
granting of summary judgment in favor of the Postal Service. See id. at 421.
162. See id. at 420. Because the Postal Service offered Mengine several positions
and continually worked with him to try to determine reasonable accommodations, the
Postal Service satisfied its good faith duty to engage in the interactive process. See id.
at 421.
163. See id. at 420. "Although Beck discussed this issue in the context of the ADA,
it is relevant to our analysis of the Rehabilitation Act because in 1992 the
Rehabilitation Act was amended to incorporate the standards of several sections of the
ADA, including the section defining 'reasonable accommodation."' Id. (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(d) (1994)); see also supranotes 146-51 and accompanying text (discussing Beck).
164. See Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420; see also notes 146-54 and accompanying text
(discussing other similar rationales of other Circuit courts).
165. See Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420.
166. See id. Information sharing allows employers and employees to better identify
suitable positions to accommodate disabilities, thereby advancing the goals of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See id.
167. See id. If a reasonable accommodation is impossible, an employer avoids
liability by simply communicating this fact to the employee. See id.
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Court holdings of whether the interactive process is a necessary
aspect of the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement range
from not mandating employer participation in the interactive process168
to requiring an employer-initiated interactive process.' 69 The best
approach, however, is one requiring employers to participate in the
interactive process once employees request a reasonable
accommodation from the employer.17 ° Specifically, once an employee
informs his employer of his disability and need for an accommodation,
the employer and employee should work together in good faith to
determine whether a reasonable accommodation is possible. 7 ' The
employer and employee should then discuss how the employee's
disability limits his ability to do his job and what the specific
accommodation should be. 7 2 Because such an approach would be
most consistent with the language of the ADA, the EEOC regulations,
the goals of the ADA, and public policy in general, it is the optimal
approach.
A. The OptimalApproach: The Interactive Process

The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to disabled individuals to ensure that employers do
not treat disabled individuals adversely and to foster integration of
disabled individuals in the workplace.' 7 3
The reasonable
accommodation provision in the ADA, however, is vague.' 7 4
168. See supra notes 106-43 and accompanying text (discussing how the Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits do not require employer participation in the EEOC's
recommended interactive process).
169. Seesupra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (discussing a Seventh Circuit
holding requiring employers to initiate the interactive process with mentally ill
individuals).
170. See supra notes 146-67 and accompanying text (discussing decisions in the
Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits that require employer participation in the EEOC's
suggested interactive process once an employee has requested a reasonable
accommodation); infra Part IV.A (positing that the optimal approach to the interactive
process is one in which the employer's duty to participate is triggered when the
employee requests an accommodation, albeit, not a specific one).
171. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the components of the optimal interactive
process, specifically that the employees should initiate the process by showing
employers that they are disabled).
172. See infra Part IV.B.3 (arguing that the liability for the breakdown in the
interactive process should attach to the party who acts in bad faith).
173. See Michael Lee, Searchingfor Patternsand Anomalies in the ADA Employment
Constellation: Who Is a Qualified Individual with a Disability and What
Accommodations Are Courts Really Demanding?, 13 LAB. L.J. 149, 150 (1997).
174. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that
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Consequently, employers often do not know how they should provide
such accommodations.' 75 To assist in resolving the ADA's ambiguity,
courts often turn to the EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing the
statute.'7 6 While the EEOC has not specifically addressed every
statutory ambiguity in the ADA,' 7 7 the EEOC has issued guidelines
regarding employer participation in providing reasonable
accommodations.' 78 These guidelines suggest employer participation
in the interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation for a
disabled worker once the worker has requested an accommodation. 179
Some courts argue that the EEOC's statement that it "may be
necessary" to have an interactive process implies that such a process is
not mandatory. 8 ° The EEOC's meaning, however, is evident from its
interpretive guidance section, which states that employers "must"
participate in the interactive process once employees have requested
accommodations. 8 '

"[t]he ADA gives only general guidance" concerning "what constitutes a 'reasonable'
accommodation."); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text (providing the text of
ADA's reasonable accommodation provision).
175. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 748.
176. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that the
EEOC Guidelines "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance")); MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 826 (4th ed. 1997) (explaining that the
"courts are likely to defer to ADA regulations that provide 'reasonable interpretations'
of ambiguous ADA provisions").
177. See Zagrodzky, supra note 12, at 949 (discussing how the EEOC has not
specifically addressed the issue of whether the ADA requires an employer to transfer a
disabled employee who requests a different position as a reasonable accommodation).
178. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3), app. § 1630.9 (1998); see supra notes 80 and 82
(providing the text of EEOC regulations and interpretive guidance, respectively).
179. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3), app. § 1630.9; see supra notes 80 and 82
(providing the text of EEOC regulations and interpretive guidance).
180. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 752 (discussing how "may be necessary" is permissive
language that only warns employers of the potential for liability for failing to
participate in an interactive process).
181. See id. at 755 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Although the regulations state "may,"
the EEOC's interpretive guidance suggests that "may" applies to only narrow
circumstances where reasonable accommodations clearly are or are not available. See id.
"The term 'may' describes the fact that sometimes there may be the necessity to engage
in an interactive process. When it is necessary, it is not optional . . . . In cases where
accommodation may be possible, the interactive process is required." Id.
Additionally, while "may" is usually construed as implying permissiveness, the
"context in which the word appears must be [the] controlling factor."
BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 676 (6th ed. 1991). Thus, while the regulations use the word "may," the
interpretive guidance clarified the meaning of "may" by requiring employer
participation. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Therefore, when
interpreted in context, "may" is not permissive. See id.
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Although the regulations are not binding, the EEOC guidelines
182
represent the expertise of an experienced law-enforcing agency.
Courts, consequently, often defer to these guidelines to assist in
statutory interpretation. 83 Thus, because the EEOC has addressed the
issue at hand, and because the EEOC constitutes a sound body of
experience, courts should defer to the EEOC's recommendations
concerning reasonable accommodation.
Moreover, courts should defer to the EEOC's recommendations
because they are consistent with the remedial goals of the ADA-to
ensure disabled workers' full participation in the workplace.184 The
interactive process involves employers and employees sharing
information typically more accessible to one side than the other. Thus,
the process ultimately allows parties to break through many existing
information
barriers
to
determine
optimal
reasonable
accommodations.1 85 For example, employers tend to have better
knowledge than employees of important areas to consider in
determining reasonable accommodations, such as the company's
overall operations, work flow, staffing needs, and available
technology for their company's specific jobs.' 86 Alternatively,
employees often have better information, or access to information,
1 87
about their particular medical conditions and inherent limitations.
Thus, without an interactive process, employees might lack the
knowledge, skill, or ability to determine optimal, or even adequate,
reasonable accommodations. 88 Likewise, employers might be unable
to provide such accommodations without knowing the employee's
specific medical condition and requirements. 8 9 By requiring an
182. See Zagrodzky, supra note 12, at 948 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
The EEOC guidelines "'constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."' Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
141-42 (1976)).
183.

See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.

184. See Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997) ("When the
interactive process works well, it furthers the purposes of the ... ADA.").
185. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755-56 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); see also Beck v.
University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1996).
186. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); Beck, 75 F.3d at 113536; supra note 84 (providing language from
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 regarding
information sharing).
187.

See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135-

36; supra note 84 (containing text from 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9); see also Simon &
Morbey, supra note 87, at 21 (noting that a disabled person's health care provider is
"likely to have the most complete understanding of the employee's condition").
188. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 755-56 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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interactive process, both employers and employees are able to break
through these information barriers and determine the best possible
reasonable accommodations for the specific situations.' 90
Although fear of liability drives most employers to participate in the
92
process,' 9' some employers have not participated in the process.
While the employers who participate in the process further the ADA's
remedial goals, those who do not choose to participate effectively
inhibit the successful implementation of the ADA. 193 Employers not
participating in the interactive process, and the circuit courts not
94
requiring them to do so, have cited reasons for their positions.
None of the cited reasons, however, comports with the goals of the
ADA. 195 For employers who already participate in the process, a
requirement to participate will not be a change and thus will not place
new burdens on them. 196

For those employers who do not already

engage in the interactive process, such a requirement will merely
require them to adhere to the practices of the numerous other
employers who do participate and, ultimately, to comply with the

190. See id. at 756 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
191. See Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997). "[T]he
possibility of an ADA lawsuit will, as a matter of practice, compel most employers to
undertake such an investigation before terminating a disabled employee." Id. (quoting
Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 1996)). See,e.g.,
Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 421 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that an employer
participated in interactive process by communicating in good faith with its employee
regarding possible reasonable accommodations); Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135-36 (concluding
that an employer engaged in interactive process by taking numerous steps to
accommodate its employee based on information the employee had provided); James G.
Sotos, ADA Accommodation Rule Applies to Both Worker, Employer, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL, Aug. 13, 1998, at 1 (citing Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1998)
(finding that the employer had engaged in the interactive process by asking the
employee for continual updates on the employee's medical condition)).
192. See, e.g., Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755-56 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) ("Some
employers are unwilling to accommodate disabled workers .... Here, U.S. Air never
even bothered to talk with Barnett."); Willis, 108 F.3d at 285 (discussing how the court
was "troubled by evidence that the employer [in Moses] had failed to investigate
accommodating the plaintiff') (citing Moses, 97 F.3d at 448). In Moses v. American
Nonwovens, Inc., the employer failed to investigate possible accommodations for an
epileptic employee who had informed the employer of his epilepsy. 97 F.3d at 448.
193. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
194. See supra Part III.A (discussing why some courts do not require employer
participation in the interactive process).
195. See generally Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755-56 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (discussing
why employer participation in an interactive process is appropriate and not unduly
burdensome on employers).
196. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 191 (providing examples of employers who
have participated in the interactive process).
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remedial goals of the ADA.'9 7

In requiring employer participation in the interactive process, courts
reject a traditional burden-shifting framework because such a
framework "provides great potential for causing precisely what the
ADA was designed to prevent."' 98 Under a burden-shifting approach,
employees with substantial knowledge of their workplace can likely
point to specific accommodations and thus will receive reasonable
accommodations.' 99 Most employees, however, do not have such an

information advantage.2 °° Rather, these employees will merely inform
their employers that they need an accommodation, and not receive
reasonable accommodations because they have failed to satisfy their
burdens of proof. 20 ' Thus, by requiring plaintiffs to show specific
accommodations, courts, in effect, exclude many disabled workers
from receiving reasonable accommodations, and thereby frustrate the
ADA's remedial goals.20 2 An interactive process, however, would
advance the remedial goals of the ADA by requiring employers to help
employees find reasonable accommodations.20 3
B. Components of the Interactive Process
An optimal interactive process should involve three components.
First, employees should initiate the process.20 4 Second, courts should
require employees to show only that they are disabled. 20 5 Third,
parties should be liable if they do not participate in the process in good
faith.20 6
1. Employees Should Initiate Process
While courts should require employers to participate in the
interactive process of finding reasonable accommodations for disabled
workers, this duty should only arise when a disabled worker has made
197. See,e.g.,cases cited supranote 192 (providing examples of employers who have
not participated in the interactive process).
198. Williams, supra note 41, at 155 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1995)); see
supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing the remedial goals of the ADA).
199. See Williams, supra note 41, at 154 (discussing how a burden-shifting
framework "demands omniscience on the part of the plaintiff before the employer has a
duty to reasonably accommodate [the employee].").
200. See id.
201. See id.
202.

See id.

203.

See id. at 154-55.

204.
205.
206.

See infra Part IV.B. 1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
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it "known" that he requires an accommodation. Such an approach is
consistent with the language of the ADA, with the EEOC regulations,
and with overall public policy.2" 7 First, the ADA's requirement that
employers reasonably accommodate employees' "known" 20 8 physical
or mental limitations implies that employers only have the duty to
reasonably accommodate employees when they are actually aware of
the need for accommodation.2" 9 Moreover, the EEOC's interpretive
guidance section specifically states that employers must only
participate once the employee has requested an accommodation." 0
Additionally, courts should not require employers to initiate the
interactive process in cases with mentally ill employees because
employees and their health care providers will have better information
about employees' specific medical conditions and needs.2"' Such a
requirement would also be unduly burdensome to implement because
employers would have to spend substantial time and money
determining who needs accommodations.2" 2
2. Employees Need Only Show Disability
Although some courts require employees to show both their
disabilities and their resulting job limitations,21 3 courts should only

207. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text (discussing an employer's right
to be informed of an employee's disability before being subjected to potential liability
for violation of the ADA).
208. "Known" is defined as "perceived; recognized; . . . generally understood."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 604 (6th ed. 1991).

209. See Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir.
1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994)). Other ADA provisions also imply
the knowledge prerequisite to employer liability.
See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(4) (prohibiting "excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a
qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual.")).
210. See 29 C.F.R. app § 1630.9 (1998); supra notes 83-84 (providing portions of
EEOC's interpretive guidance concerning the "known" requirement).
211.

See Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155,

165 (5th Cir. 1996)

(finding no employer liability because the plaintiff's request for a reasonable
accommodation "[was] too indefinite and ambiguous to constitute a formal request for
accommodation under the ADA.").
212. See id. For example, mental illness is not always facially apparent. See id. at
165. Thus, because employers do not automatically know which employees are
mentally ill, employers would have to contact each employee to determine this. See id.
This communication would probably have to be in writing and performed on a regular
basis, and thus require substantial money and time to be spent. If employees initiate the
process, however, employers will spend their time and money more efficiently, as they
will only start the reasonable accommodation process when they know that an
accommodation is needed.
213. See id. at 164.
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require employees to show that they are disabled. 214 The requirement
to show limitations has the same flaws as the requirement to show
specific accommodations under the burden-shifting framework.2 15
The importance of information sharing based upon the respective
knowledge of employers and employees necessitates that both
employers and employees work together to determine how the
employee is limited in his ability to perform the job.2 16 Furthermore,
courts should not construe the EEOC's statement that some disabilities
do not always limit employees' abilities to perform their jobs to imply
that employers should require employees to inform their employers of
the limitations resulting from their disabilities. 2 7 Rather, courts
should read this statement as a mere warning that certain impairments
limit some employees more so than others. 218 By also suggesting an
interactive process, the EEOC intended for employers and employees
to work together to determine whether a disability in fact limits a
particular employee in his ability to do his job.219
3. Liability if No Good Faith Effort in Interactive Process
While it is relatively easy to determine when an employee has come
forward with a disability, thereby requiring the employer to participate
in an interactive process, it is harder to determine the exact point in the
interactive process at which employers should incur liability. 220 As a
result, no circuit that has mandated employer participation in the
214. See Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir.
1996).
215. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (discussing why the burdenshifting framework should not apply to ADA plaintiffs).
216. See supra note 84 (providing the portion of the EEOC's interpretive guidance
that discusses the necessity of information sharing).
217. But see supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (listing arguments in
support of requiring plaintiffs to show disabilities and limitations).
218. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's statement
concerning disabilities and impairments).
219. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's suggested
As the employer typically knows more about the job
interactive process).
classifications and essential functions, and the employee knows more about his specific
disability, the two parties should work together to determine whether the specific
disability creates a limitation for the employee and whether a reasonable
accommodation is necessary. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 755-56 (9th
Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (discussing why information sharing is necessary
For example, employers can
for determining optimal reasonable accommodations).
send form letters to doctors or talk with employees in great detail about their
See Simon &
disabilities, limitations, and potentially reasonable accommodations.
Morbey, supra note 87, at 21.
220.

See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 753.
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interactive process has developed a "hard and fast rule"22 ' for process
liability.2 2 2 Requiring both employers and employees to participate in
good faith in the interactive process once the employee initiates the
process is most sensible, as it is consistent with the ADA, the EEOC,
and public policy. 223 Since the good faith requirement subjects both
employers and employees to potential liability, both parties have an
incentive to communicate with each other and share information that is
vital to providing optimal reasonable accommodations.22 4
This
information sharing will ultimately lead to better reasonable
accommodations, thereby furthering the ADA's remedial goal of
ensuring full participation of disabled workers in the workplace.2 2 5
A good faith liability requirement is also consistent with the EEOC's
intentions. The EEOC did not suggest a detailed process liability
scheme, but instead provided a four-step process suggesting how
employers should satisfy the interactive process by merely communicating with an employee about his situation.22 6 Moreover, a good
faith requirement for both parties is consistent with public policy
because it only punishes parties actually responsible for the breakdown
in the interactive process.2 2 7 It is further consistent with public policy
because it does not punish employers who participate in the process in
good faith but are unable to provide accommodations that are possible
or reasonable.2 2 8
221. See Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir.
1996). "No hard and fast rule will suffice, because neither party should be able to cause a
breakdown in the process for the purpose of either avoiding or inflicting liability ...
The determination must be made in light of the circumstances surrounding a given case."
Id. at 1135-36.
222. See supra Part LII.B (discussing the circuit decisions requiring some level of
employer participation in the interactive process).
223. See Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135; supra note 148 (discussing what constitutes good
faith).
224. See Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135-36; Williams, supra note 41, at 159.
225. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 755-56 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
226. See supra note 86 (providing the text of the EEOC's suggested four-part process
to determine reasonable accommodations). Because an employer can satisfy his duty of
participation by merely consulting with a disabled employee about his disability and
possible accommodations, the interactive process does not unduly burden employers.
See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 756 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (citing Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne
Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1996)).
227. See Beck, 75 F.3d at 1137 (finding no employer liability because the plaintiff
actually caused the breakdown in the interactive process by not continuing to
communicate with employer); Sotos, supra note 191, at 1 (discussing the Steffe court's
finding of no employer liability because plaintiff caused the breakdown in the
interactive process by failing to provide medical updates to employer).
228. See Williams, supra note 41, at 159. Employer liability, however, arises if an
accommodation were possible or reasonable, but the employer failed to participate in
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V. PROPOSAL

Since the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA is very
general and therefore controversial, Congress should amend the statute
to require employer participation in the interactive process of finding a
reasonable accommodation. Specifically, it should supplement the
current provision defining discrimination with language requiring an
interactive process to determine reasonable accommodations.229 This
language must clearly establish that the process requires both parties to
participate in good faith once the qualified individual with a disability
has shown that he is disabled.23 ° Congress should explain that a
breach of good faith involves one party failing to help the other party
make reasonable accommodations, and that either party can incur
liability23 for a lack of good faith that causes the interactive process to
break down.232 By making these changes, Congress will clarify much
of the existing confusion regarding how employers should provide
reasonable accommodations, and thus permit employers to further the
remedial goals of the ADA.
Although the EEOC regulations and interpretative guidance are not
binding, the EEOC should revise these guidelines to reflect the
suggested statutory changes.233 Specifically, the EEOC should use
the process and thereby failed to provide such an accommodation. See id.
229. A possible solution might be to amend Part (5)(C) of the Discrimination
provision of Title I of the ADA to read: "To determine a reasonable accommodation,
both employers and qualified individuals with disabilities must participate in good faith
in a flexible, interactive process, once the qualified individual with a disability has
informed his employer of his disability." See Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135-36; 29 C.F.R. app.

§ 1630.9.
230. See supra note 229 (providing a sample of such language).
231. If the employer causes the breakdown in the interactive process, the employee
has a valid cause of action under the ADA. See,e.g.,cases cited supra note 192. If,
however, the employee causes the breakdown in the process, he simply has no cause of
action; the employer is thus not liable for failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation. See,e.g.,cases cited supranote 227.
232. For example, Congress might adopt the good faith language from Beck and
state:
A failure to participate in good faith means "failure by one of the parties to
make reasonable efforts to help the other party determine what specific
A party that obstructs or delays the
accommodations are necessary.
A party that fails to
interactive process is not acting in good faith.
communicate, by way of initiation or response, may also be acting in bad
faith."
Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135 (citation omitted). Failure to communicate can include failure to
provide "information... of the type that can only be provided by one of the parties."
Id. at 1136.
233. See supranote 182 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why courts
should defer to EEOC guidelines). The EEOC is presently developing new guidance for
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mandatory, not permissive, language in the portions of the
regulations234 and interpretive guidance235 concerning employer
participation in the interactive process once the employee has initiated
the procedure. Such mandatory language will further eliminate any
remaining confusion over whether employers are required to
participate in an interactive process. The interpretive guidance should
also clarify that an employee need only inform his employer of his
disability, and not of his resulting limitations.236 In doing so, the
EEOC will also clarify the exact point at which an employer is obliged
to participate in the interactive process.23 7
While the amended ADA will define the scope of liability for the
interactive process in terms of good faith participation, the EEOC can
provide further guidance by amending and clarifying its current fourstep process for employer participation.238 First, concerning the
identification of the essential functions of jobs, the EEOC should
advise employers to prepare thorough job descriptions before they
the ADA which will address the controversial reasonable accommodation provision. See
Fawn H. Johnson, EEOC's ADA Enforcement is Lauded; Commissioner Says New
Guidance Pending, 11 Empl. Discr. Rep. (BNA) 605, 605-06 (Nov. 4, 1998). One issue
this guidance may address is "how an employee should ask for an accommodation." Id.
at 606.
234. See supra note 80 (providing the current text of the EEOC's regulations
suggesting employer participation in an interactive process). For example, rather than
saying that "it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive
process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation,"
the regulations might read "[t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation,"
employers must participate in an interactive process once a qualified individual with a
disability has shown he is in need of an accommodation.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)
(1998).
235. See supra note 82 (providing the current text of the EEOC's interpretive
guidance that suggests employer participation in an interactive process). Thus, rather
than saying that "[t]he appropriate reasonable accommodation is best determined
through a flexible, interactive process," the EEOC should change the words "is best
determined" to "are," thereby modifying the interpretive guidance to "appropriate
reasonable accommodation[s] [are] determined through a flexible, interactive process."
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
236. For example, the EEOC might add to the interpretive guidance a statement: "To
initiate the interactive process, a qualified individual with a disability need only inform
his employer that he is disabled. Once the employer knows the individual is disabled,
the two parties must work together to determine how the disability limits the
employee's ability to do his job and how the employer can reasonably accommodate the
employee." See supra note 82 (providing the present text of the EEOC's interpretive
guidance suggesting employer participation in an interactive process).
237. See supra note 236 (providing language that would require an employer to
participate in the interactive process "once the employer knows the individual is
disabled").
238. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing the EEOC's suggested
four-step process); Simon & Morbey, supra note 87, at 17-18.
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advertise or interview individuals for the positions, and to continually
update these job descriptions.2 3 9

Second, regarding employer

consultation with employees about their disabilities and limitations, the
EEOC should instruct employers to first explain to the employee that
the employer needs to know whether the employee is disabled and,
second, that the employer will require medical information to
determine this disability and subsequent limitations.24 ° The EEOC
should also advise employers, upon consent from the employee, to
personally contact the employee's health care provider for this
information.241 Third, regarding identification of accommodations, the
EEOC should warn employers to document all meetings and
conversations throughout the process, as this is evidence of the
employer's good faith effort.242 Last, concerning the selection of an
appropriate accommodation, the EEOC should remind employers that
they need only provide reasonable accommodations if they do not
create undue hardships for the employers, but warn them to carefully
analyze each situation to avoid ultimate liability.24 3
VI.

CONCLUSION

Congress enacted Title I of the ADA to prevent employers from
discriminating against disabled workers. While Congress stated in the
ADA that employers who do not provide reasonable accommodations
to disabled workers will be liable for discrimination, it failed to specify
whether employers must help employees find such reasonable
accommodations. The EEOC regulations and interpretive guidance on
this section assist parties in construing the statute, but they too are
ambiguous.
Moreover, these regulations are not legally binding. Courts are split
over whether to require employers to participate in the interactive
239. See Simon & Morbey, supra note 87, at 19. By doing so, employers will better
protect themselves from future accusations that certain requirements are not essential
functions of the job. See id.
240. See id. at 21.
241. See id. Although health care providers are those likely to best understand
employees' specific medical conditions, they invariably will not provide employees
See id. If,
with the most adequate and complete reports of their medical conditions.
however, employers send letters asking specific questions about the employees and their
disabilities, the health care providers are more likely to provide the necessary
information. See id. If the health care providers fail to respond to the letters by an
employer-specified date, employers can then have their own health care providers
examine the employees. See id. The EEOC could provide samples of letters that
employers can send to employees' health care providers. See id.
242. See id. at 23; see also Comisky, supranote 70, at 508.
243. See Simon & Morbey, supra note 87, at 23.
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process of finding a reasonable accommodation for a disabled worker.
While some courts adhere to a traditional burden-shifting framework,
other courts defer to EEOC regulations and interpretive guidance,
which suggest an interactive process. Because requiring an interactive
process is most consistent with the ADA's language, the EEOC's
regulations and interpretive guidance, the goals of the ADA, and public
policy in general, an interactive process is the better approach. Thus,
the most logical solution to the reasonable accommodation controversy
is to amend the ADA to require employer participation in an interactive
process, and to revise the EEOC regulations and interpretive guidance
accordingly.
Such changes will lead to optimal reasonable
accommodations, and thereby further the remedial goals of the ADA.
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